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Abstract 
 
Parties of ethnic minorities are flourishing in a large number of ethnically divided 
democracies. While academic research has studied their emergence and success, 
we know little about intra-group party competition. This paper discusses reasons 
for intra-group political plurality, with a focus on intra-party conflict and intra-
group party competition: it explains the political orientation of ethnic minority 
parties and their intra-group challengers as a consequence of the inclusion of 
minority parties into government. The inclusion of minority parties into national 
governments produces an inherent conflict between pragmatic office-seekers and 
radical partisans. In minority parties that have governmental responsibilities, the 
pragmatist view overwhelms, whilst in those parties in opposition, radical voices 
dominate. The formation of two intra-Hungarian challenger parties in Romania 
and in Slovakia in 2007 and 2009 represent two very similar cases, which appear 
to be in line with our hypotheses. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, the formerly dominant Hungarian minority parties in Slovakia and in Romania have 
been confronted with new parties, challenging their monopoly in the representational area, 
and opening a new chapter in ethnic party competition in both countries. In Slovakia, the 
formerly dominant minority party lost its governmental position, and in opposition, it has 
increasingly supported more extreme stances. This has led to the formation of a new 
Hungarian led party under the label Most–Híd ('bridge') in 2009, with the goal of addressing 
voters of both ethnic groups, and bridging the increasing ethnic gap. In Romania, the formerly 
dominant minority association has become more and more entangled with the Romanian state. 
It has been challenged by a series of new Hungarian political organisations since 2000, 
including a new minority party, which is playing the radicalisation game, demanding 
immediate autonomy for Hungarian enclave in Romania. The new party accuses the formerly 
dominant Hungarian elite of betraying Hungarian interests in Bucharest.  
This article sheds light on a widely neglected aspect of representation in ethnically divided 
societies. In the classical literature on power-sharing, representation is described as the 
formation of political parties that stand for the different segments of a society. There is no 
competition within these social segments, and instead, the dominant party has a 
representational monopoly. The empirical reality in many ethnically divided societies looks 
quite different, however. Oftentimes, there are salient differences in the political preferences 
within the same ethnic groups, and in many cases, this is reflected in intra-group competition 
between political parties of the ethnic majorities or between parties addressing the same 
ethnic minority group. New findings on intra-group competition might ultimately complement 
or alter the view on power-sharing, as they show that ethnic majorities and minorities are not 
homogeneous groups, but internally divided. 
Our study contributes to the understanding of intra-group divisions, by looking at political 
parties of ethnic minorities, as the main actors of electoral competition and representation of 
minority groups in divided societies. It argues that there might be exogenous reasons for the 
political moderation or radicalisation of parts of the ethnic minorities. We show that 
government inclusion - as the most important element of power-sharing arrangements - can 
destroy the political unity of the ethnic minorities, and contribute to their radicalisation. 
This stands in contrast to the classical ethnic out-bidding hypothesis, according to which 
within-group competition is the main driver for radicalisation (Rabushka and Shepsle 73-75; 
Horowitz). The focus of this article is on dominant parties of ethnic minorities. Contrary to 
the outbidding view, it argues that the inclusion or exclusion of ethnic minority parties into 
governmental coalitions alters the political balance between moderates and radicals within the 
party. Growing internal competition leads to party splits, and the position of the new party 
depends on the ideological position of the formerly dominant party. We argue that this 
contributes to the explanation of why in Slovakia, the intra-Hungarian challenger positioned 
itself more moderately than the formerly dominant party, while in Romania, the challenger 
outbid the established governing party with more radical positions. 
We selected two cases which are similar with regard to the relative size and the regional 
concentration of the minority groups, the role of external actors (the kin state and the EU), 
and (in most of the periods) to the incentives of the electoral system. While we hold these 
contextual factors constant, we study the changes in the inclusion of minority parties into 
national governments in time and across countries. 
The next section of this paper outlines our theoretical ideas about the reasons for different 
forms of within-group party competition. Section three introduces the two cases selected for 
this study, which are analysed over time in section four. Thereafter, the hypothesised effect of 
governmental inclusion is discussed in a comparative perspective. 
 
2. The interaction between within-group political dynamics and a party’s role in 
the political system  
Traditional literature on ethnic parties established a rather sceptical view on the capacity of 
ethnic parties to maintain democratic stability in ethnically divided societies. This scepticism 
is also based on the outbidding hypothesis (Mitchell; Gormley-Heenan and Macginty; 
Rabushka and Shepsle; Horowitz 342-60). It states that in situations of politicised ethnic lines, 
competition between parties addressing the same ethnic group leads to a race to the extreme: 
each competitor will need to position itself as the most credible representative of minority 
interests, involving increasingly radical arguments. This mutual radicalisation of ethnic 
parties will exacerbate ethnic conflicts and eventually undermine political stability. 
Recent studies have shown that ethnic outbidding is not an inevitable result of competition 
within the same group (Chandra; Mitchell; Gormley-Heenan and Macginty; Mitchell, Evans and 
O’Leary; Zuber). We aim to contribute to this recent literature by analysing ethnic minority 
parties who represent the interests of ethnic minorities in party competition. As a starting 
point, we argue that the form of competition and more specifically, the number of parties 
representing an ethnic group, depend on the size and local concentration of the group, in 
combination with the electoral rules. Electoral laws might give incentives to certain ethnic 
minority groups to vote uniformly for a single minority party. This happens if restrictive 
electoral rules de facto allow only one minority party to gain representation in the national 
parliament, and therefore prevent the minority group splitting its votes between several parties 
(Barkan; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich; Bochsler "Two of the Same"). This restrictive logic 
of national electoral systems might be contradicted, however, by the logic of contestation that 
prevails at the local level. Namely, if the same minority group represents the majority of 
inhabitants in some municipalities or provinces, there is an inherent drive for an intra-ethnic 
differentiation and for the representation of the group by multiple ethnic parties (Bochsler 
Contestation in Multi-Level Party Systems; Bochsler "Two of the Same"). 
The first stage of our argument refers to dominant parties of ethnic minorities, and looks 
at political dynamics within such parties.1 Even though dominant parties aim at representing 
the entire minority group, there might be internal programmatic differences. To understand 
how these two groups within ethnic minority parties collide over governmental participation, 
we rely on the literature on party politics, and consider different types of goals and benefits 
that political parties strive for (Strøm). Political parties aim at maximising their votes in 
elections, which can both be a goal in itself, but also contributes to two further goals. Firstly, 
party members have policy goals (Wittman; Chappell and Keech). Governing participation 
might help parties to include some of their goals into the coalition program. On the other 
hand, the oppositional role gives parties the possibility to maintain and campaign for radical 
changes, and to keep the pressure on for policy moves. Secondly, parties are also interested in 
gaining office, in order to appease senior party officials with political mandates which can 
generate further benefits to a larger circle of beneficiaries. As ethnic parties count on sectional 
constituencies, the clientelistic distribution of the benefits of office spoils is particularly easy 
(Kitschelt). 
Moderates and radicals, but also party basis and cadres do not weight these goals equally. 
While moderates and the party cadres profit from government inclusion – as this provides 
access to office and requires a moderation of the party, radicals and the party basis might be 
more sceptical about compromises that enable the forming of coalitions with adversary 
partners. This does not mean that moderates and cadres would agree with compromises at 
every price, nor that the radicals and the party basis would always chose to stay in opposition; 
rather we suggest that these differences in degree become vital and irreconcilable if cross-
pressures accumulate. 
Two circumstances can fuel conflicts within the political elite of the minority group 
particularly. Firstly, such internal splits of the minority can be fuelled either by the ideological 
dimension (moderates/pragmatists versus radicals), especially when the dominant minority 
                                                 
1 Parties of minorities, which run (almost) uncontested in elections, and gain the votes of the overwhelming 
majority of the voters who identify with the minority group. This gives them de-facto a monopoly in 
representing the views of the minority in parliament. 
party needs to agree to compromises in order to enter coalitions. While in some cases, this 
conflict might sometimes be overcome if the minority party adopts two faces, a responsible 
face towards the mainstream society, and a radical face for electoral purposes towards the kin 
group (Mitchell, Evans and O’Leary), the possibilities for such an intra-party balance are 
limited. 
Second, the party cadres will be more open for programmatic concessions than the basis. 
The party cadres personally benefit from being in public office, and the longer a party stays in 
government, without delivering favourable and the in the coalition agreement agreed policy 
outcomes, the higher the risk for such a conflict. Occasionally, these tensions lead to the 
emergence of an intra-ethnic challenger. As such, we define parties aiming at the votes of an 
ethnic minority group, which previously has been represented by a dominant minority party.  
Governmental inclusion is not only a reason for intra-group splits, but it also determines 
the direction of the dominant and of the challenger parties. No matter whether a split has 
occurred or not, the inclusion of a dominant minority party into government strengthens the 
office-seekers and the moderates within the party. Political compromises in favour of the 
minority appear more reachable, and the party cadres can benefit from access to public office, 
and spread these benefits. Therefore, we expect that in governmental periods the moderate 
and office-oriented party wing will rather be strengthened than in oppositional periods.  
 
Hypothesis 1: 
Dominant parties of ethnic minorities are prone to radicalise in opposition and to become 
more moderate in government. 
 
In the second stage, we address intra-group dynamics in the case of several parties,  i.e. once a 
political split within the ethnic group has occurred. While the position of the (previously) 
dominant party is a consequence of its (non-)inclusion into the governmental coalition, the 
intra-group challenger will take the opposite course, as this is where the challenger can recruit 
its members and gain votes. If the (formerly) dominant party is included into the 
governmental coalition, the moderates dominate and the radicals will break away. If, 
however, the the (formerly) dominant is in opposition, then the majority of this party follows 
a radical course, while the moderates defect. We expect that the governmental or oppositional 
role of the ethnic minority party has different consequences in cases of party splits. 
 
 
 Hypothesis 2: 
The within-group challenger takes the opposite position from the dominant minority party. 
Hence, when the dominant minority party is in government, the challenger party is likely to 
present a radical program; when the dominant minority party is in opposition, the challenger 
will instead tend towards a conciliatory program. 
 
The challenger party has the prospect of attracting a considerable number of voters, as it 
mobilises those voters at the basis of an ethnic minority group who are disappointed by the 
dominant party in government. Also, it offers a new platform, which differs from the 
dominant party, and therefore will attract a part of the electorate. This constitutes an electoral 
threat to the dominant minority party, and it will therefore need to consider the electoral 
claims of the new challenger, and readjust its own positions. If it does so, it will not allow the 
challenger to win a sufficient number of votes to survive. This situation has been 
characterised as ethnic outbidding (Gormley-Heenan and Macginty; Mitchell, Evans and 
O’Leary; Rabushka and Shepsle). 
In the classical outbidding model, the radicals are always more successful than the 
moderates in winning votes, as they are perceived as the more credible representatives of the 
ethnic interests. We alter this view and argue that as moderate challengers ask for less, they 
might have more leverage in negotiations and are able to exert policy influence. Hence 
moderates are might able to represent themselves as the more credible representative of the 
group compared to the radicals. In a nutshell, Figure 1 presents our arguments. While in 
government, the dominant minority party (DMP) moderates its claims, and as a consequence, 
splits up and is challenged by a radical challenger (IGC). Contrarily, the exclusion of the 
dominant minority party from the government leads to a more intense inter-ethnic conflict, to 
radicalisation of the dominant minority party, and to the split-off of a moderate intra-group 
challenger. 
 
xxx Figure 1 near here xxx 
 
3. Research design: the Hungarian minority parties in Romania and in the 
Slovak Republic 
We test our hypotheses through the comparison of the Hungarian minority parties in Romania 
and in the Slovak Republic. As discussed, the emergence of parties of ethnic minorities 
depends on the relative size and the territorial concentration of the minority, and the electoral 
rules. These are very similar in the two countries. The Hungarian minorities account for some 
6.6% of the countrywide population in Romania and 9.7% in Slovakia according to the last 
available census data1, and live partly concentrated in North-western Romania (Transylvania) 
and in the South of Slovakia along the Hungarian border, with some predominately ethnic 
Hungarian counties in the Central Romanian Carpathians (Harghita, Covasna) and in 
Southwestern Slovak borderland (Dunajská Streda). 
The present-day Slovakia and Transylvania once belonged to the Eastern part of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, and only after WWI, Hungary lost these areas to Romania and 
newly independent Czechoslovakia. The communist period had a mixed impact on the rights 
of Hungarian minorities. Romania knew a short-living Hungarian Autonomous Region in 
Transylvania (1952-68), and after the upheavals in Hungary in 1956, ethnic Hungarians in 
Romania were confronted with a more and more aggressive assimilation policy (Csergő 30-1; 
Bottoni). In Czechoslovakia, the Hungarians were less in the spotlight, as the Slovaks were 
the main minority. The Hungarians were just the minority within the Slovak part of the 
country. After a short period, where the post-WWII Beneš government expelled German and 
Hungarian minorities, Hungarians re-gained their citizenship in 1948, and established their 
own cultural institutions (Csergő 29-30). 
In the post-communist period, the policies of Hungary towards its external minorities have 
interfered with the discussion about minority rights both in Romania and Slovakia. 
Considering the legacies of changing borders, the mainstream political scene in both countries 
translates claims for territorial autonomy as a first step to secession of the Hungarian areas 
(Csergő 19-21; Bochsler and Szöcsik). In the Slovak case – Slovakia has a shorter history as a 
nation-state than Romania, and Hungarians settle on the border to Hungary – such fears might 
even play to a higher degree. Indeed, the Hungarians of Slovakia have been more hesitant to 
ask for territorial reforms and collective rights for minorities are perceived as much more 
radical by the Slovak mainstream society than they are in Romania. Henceforth, we spend 
attention to two external players, which have influenced the dynamics of Hungarian minority 
representation in a similar fashion in both countries. We do not claim that the influence of 
Hungarian kin state policies and European integration have no impact on the course of the 
Hungarian minority parties, but rather that they create a similar context for the domestic 
political players to negotiate minority rights. 
In the two countries, the Hungarian minorities face similar institutional hurdles for 
political representation. Romania raised its legal threshold in the electoral system for national 
parliamentary elections from 3% to 5% in 2000, while for coalitions larger thresholds apply.2 
Slovakia used to have a 5% threshold, but in 1998, the threshold for coalitions was raised 
substantially. In both cases, the threshold is fairly high in comparison to the size of the 
minority groups, and makes intra-group party competition difficult, if not impossible. For a 
single minority party, which mobilises the largest part of the ethnic Hungarians to vote for 
them, such a threshold is not an issue. However, once there are two competitors, one of them, 
if not both, will not win enough votes for parliamentary representation, and makes intra-group 
competition unattractive and risky (Bochsler "Two of the Same"). No wonder though that the 
Hungarian minority parties have merged into a single party, when the electoral threshold in 
Slovakia made the previous coalition of several minority parties unsuitable (Millard 91).3 
Both cases appear as particularly relevant with regard to intra-ethnic party competition, as the 
national political institutions appear to hinder intra-party competition. 
Our hypotheses posit that the institutional position of the ethnic minority parties is the 
main determinant for their programmatic position. We measure ethnic parties’ positions on an 
ethnonational dimension of party competition on that an ethnic majority and an ethnic 
minority parties are confronted with each other and formulate competing demands on the 
position of their groups in the state. We understand the radicalisation of an ethnic minority 
party as putting more extreme ethnically based demands forward. Legal rights that guarantee 
the protection of national minorities can be ranked from the principle of non-discrimination, 
to individual special rights for minorities that guarantee the preservation of their cultural 
distinctiveness, to self-rule in certain policy fields or territory (Brunner and Küpper). This 
hierarchy reflects an increasingly comprehensive system of minority protection. If an ethnic 
minority party’s claims change in the direction of collective special rights, this will be 
perceived as radicalisation. In the following section, we map the development of the 
institutional position of the ethnic minority parties and their programmatic positions over the 
time. We test the hypotheses by tracing how the institutional positions influenced the political 
competition within the ethnic minority and the programmatic position of the established  and 
the challenger ethnic minority parties. 
 
4. From intra-party competition to multi-party competition 
In order to test our hypotheses, we investigate the degree of radicalism of the Hungarian 
minority parties’ demands, and the internal development of the minority parties depending on 
their role in the political system over the time. After their split, the relationship between the 
new and the old parties is analysed. Our visualisation in figures 2 (Romania) and 3 (Slovakia) 
might help readers to get an overview of the process, and to understand our interpretation of 
the party trajectories. We have plotted the governing coalition (top) and the main Hungarian 
minority parties (bottom), their splits and mergers. The inclusion of a minority party into the 
national government coalition is symbolised with two rings. We also display whether this is 
related to changes in their radicalism on ethnic-nationalist issues: Radical parties or governing 
coalition with a majority nationalist program appear at the extremities, while moderates of 
both camps are in the centre. 4 Finally, the figures contain information about the composition 
of the government of Hungary (top). We point out the involvement of the Hungarian kin state 
policies in ethnic relations in Romania and Slovakia in the following paragraphs. 
 
4.1. Developments in Romania 
 
xxx Figure 2 about here xxx 
 
1990-1996: Promising start and relapse into opposition and isolation 
During communism the Hungarian minority in Romania could not establish an own mass 
organisation. Some exponents of the Hungarian minority became prominent members of the 
emerging democratic opposition in the 1980s. The UDMR was only founded in 1989 as an 
umbrella organisation encompassing different ideological platforms and interest groups of the 
Hungarian minority in Romania. In its first political document it called for the re-
establishment of an independent Hungarian education system, the use of the minority 
language in public administration, representation in public administration, in the judicial 
system and in political decision-making and for collective rights (UDMR). When after the 
revolution, the National Salvation Front (FSN) took power in 1990, the UDMR started to 
cooperate closely with the government (see figure 2, dotted rings). The government re-
established Hungarian language high schools which made the UDMR confident about the 
future, but the efforts erupted in violent inter-ethnic clashes in the town of Tîrgu Mureş in 
1990, where the ethnic mix of the population is 50-50%. The FSN was not willing to 
intervene in favour of the Hungarian minority, and, as shown in figure 2, turned towards a 
nationalist direction (for instance, with the new constitution, which ruled out cultural or 
territorial autonomy for minorities). The UDMR ceased cooperation with the FSN. This 
conflict was further accentuated when after 1994, FSDN (FSN's successor) formed a coalition 
with two ultra-nationalist parties, the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) and Greater 
Romania Party (PRM). The UDMR reacted by elaborating its concept of autonomy for the 
Hungarian minority in 1994. The awakening autonomy aspirations of the UDMR were 
supported by the conservative government in neighbouring Budapest. The support of the 
Hungarian minorities abroad was the priority of the foreign policy of the conservative 
government in Hungary (Horváth 33-34). However, the claim for autonomy was perceived, as 
too controversial in Romania. It led to the exit of the UDMR from the Democratic Convention 
of Romania (CDR), an alliance of opposition parties. In 1995 a new law on education was 
adopted that restricted the existing rights to study in minority languages at all educational 
levels. The UDMR strongly rejected this law and was backed by some international 
organisations (Horváth 24-32,39-42,93-97). 
Within the UDMR two rivalling positions emerged. The more radical position, which claimed 
autonomy as an indispensable right of the national minorities, was represented by the internal 
Reform bloc, led by the popular bishop László Tőkés. Party president Béla Markó took a 
more moderate position, advocating autonomy through a step by step strategy, with continued 
negotiation of institutional solutions.  
 
1996-2000: The UDMR in the government coalition 
After the 1996 elections, CDR and the Democratic Party (PD) formed the new centre-right 
and pro-European government and included the UDMR in an over-sized coalition, in order to 
underline their commitment to reforms and a pro-Western policy (Mandel 94). Both partners 
moved towards more moderate positions on ethnic issues (see figure 2). Especially, the 
UDMR, in exchange for their inclusion into government, made the important programmatic 
concession of dropping its controversial claim for territorial autonomy, and focused on more 
moderate aspects of its program. It aimed at improvements with regard to the use of minority 
languages in the public sphere and education in Hungarian including demanding the 
establishment of a separate Hungarian university (Horváth; Kántor and Bárdi 162).5 The EU 
strongly supported the inclusion of UDMR into the government coalition and made a 
friendship treaty between Romania and Hungarian as accession criteria which was concluded 
in 1996 (lead by a Socialist government, see figure 2)  (Jarábik 144). 
After a promising start, the UDMR’s success was partial: guarantees of using minority 
languages in local administrations and the establishment of a minority University were both 
blocked (Kántor and Bárdi 169). Minority language tertiary education was legislated, but not 
implemented (Horváth 48). 
The Reform Bloc within the UDMR became suspicious of the UDMR's participation in 
government, and repeatedly asked the UDMR to leave the coalition. Disputes arose around 
the drop of its claim for territorial autonomy, and on the plans for Hungarian higher education 
institutions (Bakk 47; Mandel 95). The basic treaty between Hungary and Romania that was 
signed by the Hungarian Socialist government in 1996 (see figure 2) was especially by the 
UDMR’s radical platform harshly criticized since the Hungarian government gave up its 
claim to include the UDMR in the negotiation as a third party and since the treaty 
delegitimized the claim for territorial autonomy (Horváth, 2004: 45; Kulcsàr & Bradatan, 
2007: 307; Mák, 2000: 24-32). 
 
The minority government of 2000-2004 and first internal splits of the UDMR 
Even if after the 2000 elections, the government changed from the centre-right to the centre-
left, the UDMR's involvement changed little. The winning Social Democrats (PSDR) formed 
a minority government, but the UDMR agreed to support it based on yearly elaborated 
cooperation agreements which contained detailed policy demands of the UDMR. These were 
partly blocked in the stage of implementation. Instead of territorial autonomy, the partners 
agreed on a decentralisation process and regional development of the Hungarian populated 
areas, especially infrastructure projects. The partners agreed to create Hungarian faculties at 
the Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, but were blocked later by the senate of the 
University, whereas the establishment of an independent Hungarian university remained a 
taboo. A law on the use of minority languages in local public administration was passed. 
The UDMR was increasingly under pressure from the moves of the new conservative 
government in Budapest (see figure 2). In 2002, the Hungarian government passed the so 
called Status Law, giving certain rights within Hungary to the external minorities, a law 
criticised both by Romania and Slovakia due to its extra-territorial consequences. While the 
UDMR initially supported the law, the moderate fractions soon joined the critics. In contrast, 
the radical wing of the UDMR would have favoured an even more radical option of dual 
citizenship, and saw the law as a means to stop the assimilation of Hungarians abroad 
(Horváth 53; Kántor and Bárdi 175). 
The radical was increasingly dissatisfied with political compromises with the Romanian 
majority parties, leading to the first internal splits of the UDMR. The activities of several 
newly emerging challenger political organisations, which quickly followed each other, were 
initially limited and centred in Harghita and Covasna, the two counties with a strong 
Hungarian majority. First, supported by the radical wing of the UDMR and by Fidesz, the 
conservative party in Hungary, the Civic Association for Oderheiu (UPE) ran as a rival 
Hungarian party in the local elections of 2000 (Udvardy). Its mandates were later cancelled by 
a controversial court rule, due to irregularities in party founding. The UPE was followed in 
2004 by the Hungarian Civic Union (MPSZ), an organisation again with local aims, funded 
under strong involvement of the UPE. Its leader, the local mayor of Odorheiu Secuiesc, a 
predominately ethnic Hungarian town in Harghita, was a member of the Reform Bloc within 
the UDMR. Due to the resistance of the UDMR, it could not register as a political party, and 
ran its candidates in the national and district elections in the two mentioned counties (Bakk, 
Szász and Székely 35), on the list of the non-ethnic People’s Action Party (PAP) instead.  
In parallel, other members of the Reform Bloc within the UDMR established two rivalling 
organisations in 2003, the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania (CNMT) and the 
Szekler National Council (CNT) (Mandel 97). CMNT accused the UDMR of being corrupt in 
government and selling out the establishment of autonomy, the main purpose of the 
organisation. CNT was focusing on the elaboration of a new plan of territorial autonomy for 
the Szekler Land6 (Eplényi 65-66). With the help of MPs of the UDMR's Reform Bloc, the 
CNMT and the CNT submitted this new autonomy plan to the Parliament in February 2004. 
Although the Parliament refused the plan a month later (Bakk 52), the initiative brought the 
issue back onto the political agenda, as the UDMR felt the threat of the CNMT. The UDMR 
reacted with a proposal to establish the Szekler Land as a development region of Romania 
(Eplényi 73-75) – which we see as a radicalising step in terms of ethnic relations (see figure 
2). The main idea was to enlarge the number of regions in such a way that the new regions 
would better correspond to the historical, traditional and cultural regional divides and so that 
the Szekler Land would exist as an independent development region. 
 
Third round of government participation: 2004-2008 
In the parliamentary period of 2004-2008, the UDMR was again in government, this time 
within a centre-right minority coalition, led by the National-Liberal Party (PNL) (see figure 
2). The organisation was struggling however, with the new rival organisations of the 
Hungarian minority. During this period in government, a law providing cultural autonomy for 
the national minorities that was pushed for by the UDMR was never adopted, although it was 
part of the coalition agreement. This law was not only strongly opposed by the mainstream 
Romanian parties, but also by all of the new alternative Hungarian political organisations. 
Similarly, neither the establishment of an independent Hungarian university, nor the 
establishment of Hungarian faculties at the Babeş-Bolyai University were achieved. The 
CNT’s proposal for the territorial autonomy of the Szekler land, and the UDMR’s demands 
for the redrawing of the borders of development regions, failed in parliament (Eplényi 73). 
The sole progress made in the view of the Hungarian minority, was the modification of the 
law on local public governance that allowed Hungarian to be retained as an official language 
in municipalities where the share of Hungarian inhabitants had dropped below 20%. 
As it is displayed in figure 2, in the electoral field, the UDMR was challenged in 2007 by 
the Hungarian Civic Union (MPSZ) that had registered as a political party and renamed itself 
the Hungarian Civic Party (PCM). The PCM ran its own candidates in the local elections and 
supported independent candidates in the national elections in 2008 (Kántor and Pászkán 15). 
While the party elite was recruited from all areas where Hungarian live, its candidates in the 
elections and votes were mainly concentrated in minority-majority areas – e.g in the Covasna 
and Harghita regions. Yet, because of its rather weak electoral performance in comparison to 
the UDMR, the PCM as the main challenger of the UDMR, was slowly replaced by the 
CNMT, which could count on a very popular and powerful president, Bishop László Tőkés, 
from Timisoara, far away from the CNMT strongholds. Tőkés successfully took part in the 
elections for the European Parliament in 2007 as an independent candidate. Nevertheless, the 
new rival organisations remained relatively weak compared to the UDMR and could not 
replace the UDMR as the main minority organisation of Hungarians. While in the beginning, 
the new alternative organisations were united in their campaign for the realisation of 
autonomy and to act against the UDMR, in time they became entrapped in diverse disputes. 
Additionally, it slowly came to light that, in terms of internal democratic organisation, they 
were not necessarily doing better than the UDMR. 
The challenger organisations were supported by the conservative government in Budapest 
before the Socialists took over the government in 2002 (figure 2), and the issue of external 
minorities lost priority (Waterbury). However,  the main Hungarian conservative party Fidesz 
maintains close ties to these new challenger organisation. The support of Fidesz of the radical 
wings of the Hungarian minority or of Hungarian governments of Hungarian cultural 
institutions in Romania and Slovakia also involved the establishment of clientelistic networks. 
These clientelistic networks of the radical wings balance to some degree the office spoils that 
the UDMR are able to extract from government participation.  
 
Again in opposition for a year in 2009 
As the PCM could not score major electoral successes, and as the UDMR found itself after 
2008 in opposition for the first time in 12 years, cooperation between the rivalling 
organisations became easier. The weakened position of the UDMR in the opposition led to the 
dismissal of several Hungarian heads of regional public administration institutions (Bartunek, 
2010: 343). The politicisation of these offices led to massive protest by the UDMR and was 
also followed by some public demonstrations by the Hungarian minority. As of 2009, the 
UDMR and the CNMT institutionalised their cooperation, both in elections and in 
programmatic terms. They formed working groups for main issues such as autonomy, higher 
education, and for constitutional and electoral legislation. For the European Parliamentary 
elections in 2009, they ran with a joint list. Yet the new education law of 2009 contained 
some significant improvements related to the concerns of national minorities. University 
faculties could now be founded by government decree and not only by the decision of the 
university senate, implying that finally, the Hungarian departments at the Babeş-Bolyai 
University were opened.7 After the government crisis of autumn 2009, the UDMR again 
joined the government led by the PD-L (see rings in figure 2).  
 
4.2. The developments in the Slovak Republic 
 
xxx Figure 3 about here xxx 
 
The fragmented political representation of the Hungarians until 1998 
During the communist regime the Hungarian minority’s only mass organisation was the 
Czechoslovak Hungarian Workers' Cultural Association (CSEMADOK). It had cultural goals, 
but during the Prague Spring in 1968, it became also an advocate of minority rights (Varga). 
At the end of 1970s the political opposition within the Hungarian minority against 
communism was growing and in 1978 the Czechoslovak Hungarian Minority Rights 
Committee (CSMKJB) was founded that claimed for more rights for the Hungarian minority 
but also for democratic transition (Tóth 248). After the breakdown of the communist regime, 
the Hungarian minority quickly mobilized. The Hungarian political party scene in Slovakia 
was composed of three major Hungarian parties and two minor ones in the beginning of the 
1990s. They were mainly divided by their relationship with the past regime. Regional divides 
reflecting a different level of economic development of the Eastern and Western part of the 
Hungarian region in Slovakia have never become sources of political divides within the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia. The Independent Hungarian Initiative (MOS), a liberal party, 
has cooperated with Public Against Violence (VPN), the major Slovak force behind the velvet 
revolution in Czechoslovakia. In 1990 it ran with VPN in the federal and national elections 
and it entered the government at both levels (Öllös 54). Two other Hungarian parties, the 
Coexistence movement (Spolužitie) that emerged from the CSEMADOK and the Hungarian 
Christian-Democratic Movement (MKDH) were rooted in the Christian-Democratic tradition. 
They ran jointly in the 1990 federal and national elections, and joined the opposition in 
Parliament. After the rise of the electoral threshold to 5% in 1992, the minority parties could 
only succeed in coalitions. The Independent Hungarian Initiative, renamed as the Hungarian 
Civic Party (MOS), went alone, and failed. Coexistence and the MKDH8 entered Parliament 
in a coalition, but stayed in opposition (Öllös 55). Two years later, learning from the failure of 
the MOS in the previous elections, the three minority parties (Coexistence, the MKDH, the 
MOS) formed an electoral coalition. Forced by the renewed tightening of the electoral rules in 
1998 which included the introduction of a higher threshold for coalitions than parties, the 
coalition merged into one party under the name the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) 
(see figure 3).9  
In the beginning of the 1990s, all Hungarian minority parties were calling for collective 
rights and were elaborating their own autonomy plans. Despite its name, Coexistence was the 
most radical among the three major Hungarian parties; not only demanding cultural, but also 
territorial autonomy (Öllös 64-67; Szarka "The Multi-Party System" 85-91). The peak of the 
Hungarian parties’ aspiration for territorial autonomy culminated in a gathering of Hungarian 
local mayors and representatives in 1994 which was initiated by Coexistence. However in 
1996, the administrative reform decreased the number of territories with Hungarian 
majorities, aiming at undermining future attempts to establish territorial autonomy in the 
mainly Hungarian-populated territories. In a similar vein, in 1990 Coexistence had already 
submitted a draft law on the establishment of an independent Hungarian university which was 
rejected in the federal parliament (Sándor 36-38). Finally, the new language law in 1995 
forbade the use of any language except Slovakian in the state administration so that the main 
demands of the Hungarian parties in Slovakia have been largely ignored by the Mečiar 
governments (Hamberger "Can the Use" 3). 
 
The SMK in government (1998 - 2006) 
From 1998 to 2006 the now unified Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) was in the pro-
democratic government of Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda, with the Slovak Democratic 
Coalition as main coalition partner (re-established in 2002 as Slovak Democratic and 
Christian Union (SDKÚ) (Öllös 56). The coalition was oversized, and the SMK was included 
in order to underline the coalition’s commitment to oust Mečiar and to restore good relations 
with the West (Krause 69). The SMK was allowed to participate in government on the 
condition that it renounced its most controversial claims: it would no longer mention the 
foundation of an independent Hungarian university, territorial autonomy on ethnic basis, or 
the abolition of the Beneš decrees (Szarka "Administrative Reform" 128). In figure 3, this is 
displayed as a party trajectory towards more moderate fields. The SMK thereafter focused on 
administrative reform and on tertiary education in Hungarian (Hamberger "The Hungarian 
Coalition" 107). However, the implementation of the government program was not as fast as 
the SMK might have hoped. The reversal of the regulations of the former Mečiar government 
(e.g. the restoration of the right to bilingual report cards and school records, the reinstatement 
of dismissed school principals) were less controversial than new rights for the Hungarian 
minority (Hamberger "The Hungarian Coalition" 110; Némethová and Öllös 125). The 
adoption of a law on the use of minority language, and administrative reforms were a 
precondition for the negotiations about EU access: the pressure was on to reach a compromise 
on these, despite the fact that the issue was highly contested between the SMK and the Slovak 
majority parties. The new minority language law was passed in 1999, but while enabling the 
use of minority languages, the threshold was set higher than asked for (20% minority 
population instead of 10%) (Hamberger "The Hungarian Coalition" 108). While new financial 
sources were provided for education in the Hungarian language, a Hungarian university 
faculty was not opened (Némethová and Öllös 120-34). The law on administrative reforms in 
2001 did not fulfil the central demand of the SMK to create a county with a Hungarian 
majority, due to opposition from the left-wing parties in the coalition, the Party of Civic 
Understanding (SOP) and the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) (Hamberger "The 
Hungarian Coalition" 109; Szarka "Administrative Reform" 128-31).  
European institutions were able to exert leverage on the level of minority protection in this 
period since if the government coalitions supported European integration and democratisation. 
However, minority rights remained vaguely formulated as conditions of EU accession, 
therefore domestic actors were oftentimes able to interpret “Western norm” favourable to 
their own strategies (Csergö 74-77). The conservative governing party Fidesz also tried to 
interpret European norms according to its interests and tried to put the Beneš decrees on the 
political agenda in 2002, demanding that their removal should be a condition for EU 
membership. The SMK stuck however to its agreement that the question would not be opened 
ongoing government period (Jarábik 146). 
After the 2002 parliamentary elections, the new centre-right coalition had a very narrow 
lead, and the SMK votes were needed to gain a majority (figure 3). Similar to the previous 
legislative period, the SMK did not manage to include its demands for administrative reform 
that would have eased the establishment of territorial autonomy and the abolishment of the 
Beneš decrees. The main success of the SMK in this government period was the establishment 
of an independent Hungarian university in Komarno (Jarábik 148; Hamberger "The 
Hungarian Coalition" 111).  
The ideological differences between the parties which formed the SMK soon disappeared 
after the merger in 1998, and the Christian conservative and the ethno-nationalistic line 
represented by Coexistence and the Hungarian Christian-Democratic Movement dominated. 
Quarrels emerged on the question of programmatic concessions that the party made to join the 
coalition: it did not insist on creating a region with a Hungarian majority, while the law on 
administration reform and the use of minority languages were not in line with the SMK's 
demands. Not surprisingly, in the second government period internal struggles centred on the 
question of autonomy (Hamberger "The Hungarian Coalition" 113-15). The adoption of the 
Status Law by the conservative government in Budapest fuelled the tensions within the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia. The SMK – after an initial trial to mediate between Budapest 
and Bratislava – withdrew from the discussion (Jaràbik, 2003: 146-148). The founding of a 
minor Hungarian party that wanted to put the territorial reforms back on the political agenda 
(the Hungarian Federalist Party, MFP) had little successful (Új Szó "Protests Against").10  
 
Back in the opposition, and the SMK split (2006 - 2010) 
The new government coalition of economic left-wing and nationalist parties (Smer, SNS, 
HZDS) of 2006 excluded the SMK. During this government period the SMK was largely 
absorbed by its growing internal struggles. In 2007 Béla Bugár, the president of the SMK 
since its inception, was replaced by Pál Csáky. On this occasion Csáky openly criticized 
Bugár for its accommodative course and for representing the interests of private economic 
circles (Šutaj and Sápos "The Hungarian Minority" 43-44). During 2007, the new party 
leadership planned to submit a proposition on the restitution to the victims of the Beneš 
decrees – a very controversial move in Slovak politics (see the change of SMK’s course in 
figure 3). Facing massive internal and external critique, the SMK soon abandoned the matter. 
However, the seed of conflict was sown. The most controversial issues (territorial autonomy, 
Beneš decrees) were taken on by extra-parliamentary associations, representing radical voices 
of the Hungarian minority (Šutaj and Sápos "The Hungarian Minority" 44-47; Šutaj and 
Sápos "The Situation Of" 27-31). The Slovak government reacted by adopting contrary 
resolutions and regulations on the Beneš decrees and on the use of minority languages. 
Despite the new SMK leadership distancing itself from the controversial move, a large 
part of the party's representatives, led by the former party president of the SMK Bugár, split 
off in summer 2009, and established a new party (displayed in figure 3). Under the label 
Most–Híd ('bridge' in Slovak and Hungarian), they were already competing in the regional 
elections in autumn 2009. Most–Híd was founded in the spirit of cooperation between the 
Slovak and the Hungarian people and of any other national minority, proclaiming Slovakia as 
a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and a multi-lingual state. Among others, its main demand in the 
minority field is the adoption of a comprehensive law on the status of minorities. 
Furthermore, it demanded the option for minority languages to be used in interactions with 
public authorities in municipalities with a minority share of 10% of the population. Finally, it 
demanded the modification of the controversial language law, in particular the abolishment of 
the sanctions for infringements (Most-Híd). Most–Híd also proposed a reconciliation process 
between Hungary and Slovakia. This was their answer to rising tensions between the new 
Hungarian conservative-nationalist government and the Slovak nationalists, after the 
Hungarian government announced citizenship for ethnic Hungarians abroad.11  
In the 2009 regional elections Most–Híd remained largely electorally insignificant, 
receiving less than 1% of the votes. In the parliamentary elections in 2010 Most–Híd won 
8.1% of the votes and SMK 4.3%. Most-Híd succeeded in all areas of Slovakia with a relevant 
Hungarian population. However, only a small percentage of Slovaks and other minority 
groups might have voted for Most–Híd. Nevertheless, among the 14 Most–Híd deputies in 
parliament, only seven were ethnic Hungarian, and the other seven ethnic Slovaks. 
While Most–Híd presented a full-scale program, focusing not only on minority issues, the 
SMK's program was still focused on the situation of the Hungarian minority. It also touched 
on sensitive issues, which would not ease cooperation with the Slovak parties, and which 
Most-Híd did not address: the extension of minority self-governance in the field of culture, 
education and regional public administration, the creation of minority-dominated regions, and 
(implicitly) a call for the elimination of the Beneš decrees (SMK-MKP). The SMK brand 
marked Most–Híd as a betrayer of the Hungarian interests in its electoral campaign, 
unsuccessfully however. When in 2010, the Hungarian government introduced citizenship and 
voting rights for Hungarian minorities abroad, Hungarian minority parties in neighbouring 
states needed to intermediate between the governments of their host and kin state, in order to 
avoid a polarisation which might have been detrimental to their position (Jarábik 146-48; 
Hamberger "The Hungarian Coalition" 114-15). In Slovakia, the issue received more 
attention, as it coincided with the electoral campaign. Accordingly, the SMK leadership asked 
the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán not to campaign on their side in the electoral 
campaign in 2010 since they feared that radical right parties would play the “Hungarian card”. 
The success of Most–Híd and the failure of the SMK to enter the parliament and the next 
government, were completely unforeseen and had an effect akin to an earthquake in the 
political landscape of the Hungarian community in Slovakia.  
 
The multi-ethnic party Most–Híd in government (2010 - ) 
The Most–Híd party joined the centre-right government led by the SDKÚ-DS coalition, which 
had a more conciliatory program towards the Hungarian minority than the previous left-wing-
nationalist coalition (see figure 3). Most of Most–Híd's demands made it into the 
governmental program, especially the planned modification of the state language law 
cancelling financial sanctions for infringements, the decrease of the threshold for the use of a 
minority language, and double citizenship rules for the Hungarians of Slovakia. The only 
point that was not included in the governmental program was a law on the status of minorities. 
Meanwhile, the Hungarian government further fuelled tensions by additionally granting 
voting rights for members of the Hungarian minorities who take up the Hungarian citizenship, 
hindering a compromise in the Slovak coalition. 
The SMK’s reaction to the government program was mixed. Some of the demands were 
criticized as not been extensive enough, like the modifications of the language law and the 
failure to include a law on the status of minorities (Új Szó "Provisions against Hungarians"). 
Yet the SMK has ceased bringing up the most controversial issues such as the Beneš decrees, 
the reform of the territorial structure of the public administration or the call for autonomy. 
 
5. Discussion 
Large parts of the literature on power-sharing deal with ethnic minorities as unified, 
monolithic blocs, which can be considered as single actors. This article puts this view into 
question, and brings the internal political dynamics of ethnic minorities in, by studying splits 
between parties of ethnic minorities. The structure and the positioning of ethnic minority 
parties might have important consequences for the prospect of political solutions of ethnic 
conflicts, not least because internal political splits of ethnic minorities in some cases might 
foster ethnic outbidding, yet in others facilitate the formation of cross-cutting cleavages and 
the creation of inter-ethnic coalitions. 
This article discusses the impact of domestic politics on the degree to which ethnic 
minority parties radicalise their positions. It argues that the inclusion of parties of ethnic 
minorities into governmental coalitions affects their internal political dynamics and their 
positioning. As a consequence, it also determines the political direction of intra-group 
challengers, i.e. parties which compete against a dominant ethnic minority party. Empirically, 
the article looks at the formation of two new parties of the Hungarian minorities in Romania 
and in Slovakia, in 2007 and 2009. In the two cases, new parties emerged, and were 
competing against a previously dominant party of the Hungarian minority. 
 
5.1. The interplay of governmental inclusion and minority party dynamics 
In both countries, the splits only happened after the parties of the Hungarian minorities had 
been established for 10 or 15 years. During the first half of the 1990s, in both countries, two 
camps emerged that had a different view on how autonomy for the Hungarian minority should 
be established. Moderates favoured a close cooperation with mainstream parties and saw 
government participation as the main tool for policy influence. Radicals insisted on the 
immediate establishment of autonomy. When in 1996 in Romania and 1998 in Slovakia, the 
Hungarian minority parties were included in the government coalitions, they renounced their 
calls for territorial autonomy. Radicals complained that the moderate party leaderships 
unnecessarily put these on hold or even completely abandoned them, and their governmental 
inclusion was motivated solely by private interests. Growing internal tensions finally led to 
the split of the dominant Hungarian minority parties. 
 
5.2. The political orientation of the intra-group challenger parties 
In Slovakia, the dominant minority party became more radical after it was no longer included 
in the government and a new leadership took over. Dissatisfied with this confrontational style, 
a breakaway fraction formed a new, moderate challenger party. 
The contrary happened in Romania. The UDMR was perceived to be moderate, as it 
renounced crucial political claims, leading to growing dissatisfaction among the radicals 
within the party. The radical break-away factions organized themselves in different 
organisations outside the framework of the UDMR. On the one hand, the CNMT and its 
satellite organisation the CNT are aiming for the realisation of a comprehensive system of 
autonomy addressing the concerns of the whole Hungarian community. On the other hand, 
since 2001, the Hungarian Civic Party has been evolving in a mainly bottom-up process with 
a main goal of providing an alternative to the UDMR in the counties with a Hungarian 
majority, and the realisation of the territorial autonomy of the Szekler Land. 
 
5.3. Comparison to other cases 
The mechanism at play might possibly be generalisable for ethnic minorities in other 
countries too. Further examples, to which our model might extend, include the Albanian 
minority parties in Macedonia, or the Bosniak parties in Serbia. In line with the Romanian and 
Slovak examples, the fluctuation and programmatic change of these parties might be driven 
by their inclusion into the government, or their status as oppositional. 
While our findings are based on two particular examples, and should therefore be taken 
with the necessary grain of salt, they might eventually add to the understanding of political 
conflict in ethnically divided societies. One major concern of the literature is that the 
competition between different parties of the same ethnic group leads to a spiral of mutual 
radicalisation. The two discussed cases might alter this view. Minorities are internally split, 
typically between radicals and pragmatists – and therefore, ethnic outbidding is not the only 
game in town. Instead, we argue that domestic politics matter: the (non-)inclusion of minority 
parties into the government can influence their positioning.  
The conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis open a whole set of questions: If 
alternation of parties between government and opposition prevents radical outbidding, would 
it be more advisable not to include parties of the ethnic minorities into governments on a 
permanent basis, but rather case by case, based on a coalition agreement? This especially 
sheds light on a distinction of different types of power-sharing solutions: those, where 
government inclusion is granted automatically to all relevant social groups (or the largest 
parties representing them), and cases where the governmental inclusion is based on coalition 
negotiations, and where henceforth, we expect a premium on moderation. Future research 
might explore the inter-connection of intra-ethnic competition and power-sharing agreements. 
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1 2002 census of the National Institute of Statistics of Romania 
(http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/RPL2002INS/vol5/tables/t16.pdf [last accessed on 15 March 2010 ]). 2001 census 
of the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic 
(http://portal.statistics.sk/files/Sekcie/sek_600/Demografia/SODB/Tabulky/Tabulky_AJ_SODB/tab11.pdf [last 
accessed on 15 March 2010 ]) 
2 The Romanian electoral system further foresees special seats for ethnic minority parties – amounting to 18 in 
the 2004 parliamentary elections. Each minority list that reaches a threshold of votes – just 10% of the votes 
usually needed for a parliamentary seats – is guaranteed a minority seat in parliament, but each minority group 
can obtain only one such seat (Alionescu). These rules guarantee the representation of small minorities, but 
restrict representation to only one MP (and one party/organisation per minority group), and jointly, the 
representatives of the small minorities relativise the importance of the Hungarian minority as the largest minority 
group. 
3 In 2008, Romania has changed to a mixed compensatory electoral system, still keeping the 5% national legal 
threshold. While since, it is possible for a party to win single-seat districts in a district, it is implausible that a 
dissident minority party will win six or more direct district seats – as much as would be exempted from the 
threshold requirement according to the new Romanian electoral law. 
4 The degree of radicalism is not measured in absolute terms in this paper, and can therefore not be compared 
across countries. 
5 There has been a considerable speculation on the existence of a secret protocol on the conditions of co-
operation between the UDMR and the other coalition parties. However, it is most likely that apart from the 
governmental program no other written documents existed which has also been signed by the UDMR (Horváth 
2002: 46; Kántor and Bárdi 2000: 162). 
6 Szekler Land is the part of Transylvania with a Hungarian minority and which encompasses Hargitha and 
Covasna counties and parts of the Mureş county. 
7 Further, Romanian could from now on be taught by special books and according to special plans to national 
minorities. Yet, the longstanding claim for the education of the subjects of history and geography in minority 
language remained unfulfilled (Bartunek 352-53). 
8 The alliance included a third minor Hungarian party, the Hungarian People’s Party which however has not 
managed to enter the parliament. 
9 In 1995 the Hungarian People’s Movement for Reconciliation and Welfare has been formed. It run in the 
national elections in 1998 but received only 0.19% of the votes (Millard 86). 
10 The party did not even manage to collect sufficient signatures for registration, and gathered solely a few 
hundred people in a demonstration in 2003 (Új Szó "Protests Against").  
11 In the forefront of the national elections in Slovakia the new conservative right Hungarian government 
announced the introduction of double citizenship for ethnic Hungarians abroad. This highly symbolic and 
controversial move of the Hungarian government was followed by the Slovak government’s restriction of the 
law on citizenship threatening the Hungarians to lose their Slovak citizenship if they would embrace the 
Hungarian citizenship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
